Right regulation of the actions of so complex a being as man, living under conditions so complex as those presented by a society evidently forms a subject matter unlikely to admit of specific statements throughout its entire range.
The primary division of it–private conduct–necessarily dependent in part on the nature of the individual and his circumstances, can be prescribed but approximately; and guidance must, in most cases, be partly determined by a judicial balancing of requirements and avoidance of extremes.
Those who have not read the first division of this work will be surprised by the above title.
But the chapters “Conduct in General” and “The Evolution of Conduct” will have made clear to those who have read them that something which may be regarded as animal ethics is implied.
Beyond serving to reinforce the injunctions of beneficence, by adding to the empirical sanction a rational sanction, the contents of Parts V and VI have these claims to attention: First, that under each head there are definitely set down the various requirements and restraints which should be taken into account: so aiding the formation of balanced judgments.